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Abstract: We discuss ways in which category theory might be useful in philosophy of science, in
particular for articulating the structure of scientific theories. We argue, moreover, that a categorical
approach transcends the syntax-semantics dichotomy in 20th century analytic philosophy of science.
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Our aim in this article is to recommend category theory to philosophers of science, in particular
as a means to articulating the structure of scientific theories. We are not suggesting that we replace
first-order logic, model theory, set theory, and similar formal tools with category theory — as if
category theory were just one more competitor among various formal approaches to philosophy of
science. Much less are we proposing to replace set theory with category theory as the foundation
of mathematics. Rather, we suggest that category theory unifies various approaches to formal
philosophy of science, and shows that some of the debates between various approaches have been
misguided. But most importantly, our proposal is not ideological, i.e. we have no stake in the claim
that category theory is the “one and only correct” approach to scientific theories, much less that,
“a scientific theory is a category.” Rather, we are merely sketching a program of research in formal
philosophy of science: we suggest that it might be interesting to think of the “universe” of scientific
theories as a category of categories, or more precisely, as a 2-category of categories.
Our proposal includes the idea that familiar scientific theories (e.g. Hamiltonian mechanics,
special and general relativity, quantum mechanics, quantum field theory) can themselves fruitfully
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be described as categories.1 If we represent theories this way, then we can take philosophical
questions — e.g. are Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics equivalent theories? — make them
precise, and then use mathematical tools to answer these questions. We can also suggest various
explications of important notions, such as equivalence or reducibility, and can then try to prove
general theorems about such notions. In short, while we make no argument that we ought to use
category theory, we would like to convince philosophers that category theory opens up a treasure
trove of technical projects.
1 Theories as categories
Before we begin to discuss scientific theories, we review some basic notions of categorical logic, in
order to frame the discussion of theories as categories. There are two salient ways in which a theory
can be thought of as a category — a syntactic way, and a semantic way.
1.1 The syntactic category
In this entire chapter, when we speak of first-order logic, we mean first-order logic with possibly
many sorts. Allowing the flexibility of many sorts doesn’t truly add to the expressive power of
first-order logic; but ignoring the possibility of many sorts can lead to needless confusions (see
Barrett and Halvorson, 2015c).
What we mean by “many sorted” logic is that a signature Σ comes with a (finite) list σ1, σ2, . . .
of types, and variables, quantifiers, etc. are tagged by a particular type. For example, for each
type σ, there is an equality symbol =σ, which can be applied only to terms of type σ. Similarly,
each predicate symbol p ∈ Σ has an arity σ1 × . . .× σn, where σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ are (not necessarily
distinct) sort symbols. Likewise, each function symbol f ∈ Σ has an arity σ1× . . .×σn → σ, where
σ1, . . . , σn, σ ∈ Σ are again (not necessarily distinct) sort symbols. Lastly, each constant symbol
c ∈ Σ is assigned a sort σ ∈ Σ. In addition to the elements of Σ we also have a stock of variables.
We use the letters x, y, and z to denote these variables, adding subscripts when necessary. Each
variable has a sort σ ∈ Σ.
Given a signature Σ, we define the terms and formulas of Σ in the normal way (see Barrett
and Halvorson, 2015b). A theory T in Σ, in the sense of first-order logic is a set of sentences (or
1For more on this idea, including evidence of its fruitfulness, see (Weatherall, 2016).
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sequents) of Σ. There are, of course, many well known examples of such theories: e.g. the theory
of partially ordered sets, the theory of groups, the theory of Boolean algebras, the theory of vector
spaces over a field, the theory of categories, etc..
The immediate goal is to associate a category CT with a theory T . For several reasons, we
will suppose that the theory T is formulated in the coherent fragment of first-order logic, whose
only connectives are ∧ and ∨, and whose only quantifier is ∃.2,3 The standard way of building a
“syntactic category” for T is described in many works on categorical logic — see (MacLane and
Moerdijk, 2012, p. 555), (Makkai and Reyes, 1977, p. 241), (Johnstone, 2002, p. 841), and (van
Oosten, 2002, p. 39). In outline: an object of the syntactic category CT is a formula in context, i.e.
if φ is a formula of Σ, and if ~x is a string of variables containing all those free in φ, then {~x.φ} is a
formula in context. (Note that the objects of CT depend only on the signature Σ, and not on the
theory T .) Defining the arrows for CT takes a bit more work. Let χ(~x, ~y) be a formula of Σ, where
~x and ~y are mutually disjoint sequences of variables. We say that χ(~x, ~y) is a T -provably functional
relationship from {~x.φ} to {~y.ψ} just in case T entails that, “for any ~x such that φ(~x), there is a
unique ~y such that ψ(~y) and χ(~x, ~y).” (The precise definition can be found in the aforementioned
works on categorical logic.) Then we define an arrow from {~x.φ} to {~y.ψ} to be an equivalence
class, relative to T provable equivalence, of T -provably functional relations from {~x.φ} to {~y.ψ}.
The idea of a syntactic category might seem abstract and unfamiliar. But it’s a direct general-
ization of the more familiar idea of a Lindenbaum algebra from propositional logic. Suppose that
Σ = {p0, p1, . . .} is propositional signature, and let T be a theory in Σ. In this case, a formula in
context simplifies to a sentence; and so the objects of CT are just sentences. In this case, there
is one provably functional relation (up to T -provable equivalence) between φ and ψ just in case
T, φ ` ψ and otherwise there is no such provably functional relation. In other words, in CT for a
propositional theory T , there is an arrow from φ to ψ just in case T, φ ` ψ.
Thus, from a theory T (considered as a set of sentences in Σ) we have constructed a category CT .
2Strictly speaking this means that a theory T is a set of sequents of the form φ ` ψ where φ and ψ are coherent
formulas. Alternatively, one can understand such sequents as first-order sentences of the form ∀~x(φ → ψ) (where
~x includes the unbound variables of both φ and ψ). In order not to deviate too much from the standard notation
familiar to philosophers and logicians alike we will consider coherent theories to be sets of first-order sentences of the
above-described form – this will allow us to speak of truth and satisfaction of a sentence rather than of a sequent,
which is closer to the standard way of thinking about these matters.
3There is reason to think that the coherent fragment is adequate to formulate any theory that can be formulated
in full first order logic. In particular, via Morleyization, every first-order theory is Morita equivalent to a coherent
theory (see Tsementzis, 2015). What’s more, we agree that coherent logic is special: “there are good reasons why it
is better to take Lgωω as basic rather than Lωω.” (Makkai and Reyes, 1977, p. 121).
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And note that CT partially eliminates the “language dependence” of T , which was so bemoaned
by advocates of the semantic view of theories. Indeed, while T is bound to a particular signature
Σ, the syntactic category CT is independent of signature in the following sense: two theories T and
T ′, in different signatures, can nonetheless have equivalent syntactic categories.
But is the syntactic category CT an adequate representative of the original theory T? Here we
answer in the affirmative, following Makkai and Reyes:
“In Chapter 8 we will show that, in a sense made precise there, logical [i.e. coherent]
categories are the same as theories in a finitary coherent logic Lgωω.” (Makkai and Reyes,
1977, p. 121)
And also:
“The content of 8.1.3 and 8.1.4 can be expressed by saying that for all practical purposes,
T and CT are the same.” (Makkai and Reyes, 1977, p. 241)
In what sense are T and CT the same? There are a couple of ways we could answer this
question. First, the theory T can be reconstructed from CT in the following sense: each coherent
category C gives rise to a canonically specified (coherent) theory TC . TC is (essentially) the set
of sentences satisfied by C when C is understood as a model of the theory of coherent categories,
i.e. the “total” theory of C qua coherent category. More precisely, for any coherent category C we
have its canonical language ΣC whose sorts are the objects of C and function symbols the arrows
of C (sorted in the obvious way). Over this language ΣC we can then express in a straightforward
way what it is for a diagram in C to commute, what it is for a diagram to be a product diagram
etc. TC is then the collection of all those ΣC-sentences expressing all those facts that are true of C
as a coherent category. We then have:
Theorem 1. Given a theory T , and its syntactic category CT , the internal theory TCT of CT is
Morita equivalent to T .
For the proof, see (Tsementzis, 2015, Corollary 4.6). We will further explain the notion of
Morita equivalence in the following subsection as well as argue for its suitability as a good notion
of equivalence between theories. For now, one may simply read the above result as “T is equivalent
to TCT ” and take it on faith that “Morita equivalence” is a sensible notion of equivalence between
theories.
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Second, the category Mod(T ) of models of T can be reconstructed from its syntactic category
CT .
Theorem 2. Let T be a coherent theory, and let CT be its syntactic category. Let Coh(CT ,S) be
the category whose objects are coherent functors from CT into the category S of sets, and whose
arrows are natural transformations. Let Mod(T ) be the category whose objects are models of T , and
whose arrows are homomorphisms between models. Then Coh(CT , S) is equivalent to Mod(T ).
For the proof, see (Makkai and Reyes, 1977, p. 240).
The two preceeding results show the sense in which there is no loss of essential information
in passing from a theory T to its syntactic category CT . (In particular, the Morita equivalence
class of a theory can be recovered from that theory’s syntactic category.) It is tempting now to
conjecture that if T and T ′ are Morita equivalent, then CT and CT ′ are equivalent categories. But
that conjecture fails, since the categories CT and CT ′ might not be “conceptually complete” in the
sense of Makkai and Reyes (1977). We discuss this issue further in the following subsection.
1.2 Equivalent theories
Before proceeding to discuss the semantic category Mod(T ) associated with a theory T , we will
briefly discuss some ideas about when two theories are equivalent (for further discussion and techni-
cal results, see (Barrett and Halvorson, 2015a,b; Tsementzis, 2015)). The first question to be asked
here is what notion of equivalence are we intending to capture? Our answer here is that we have no
intention of capturing any Platonic essence of “equivalence.” Rather, just as a group theory gives
us a fruitful notion of equivalence between groups (viz. isomorphism), and just as category theory
gives us a fruitful notion of equivalence between categories (viz. categorical equivalence), so when
theories are treated as mathematical objects, we hope to find a notion of equivalence that will be
useful and illuminating.
The strictest notion of equivalence between theories is logical equivalence: two theories T and
T ′ are said to be logically equivalent just in case they are formulated in the same signature Σ, and
they have the same logical consequences among the sentences of Σ. Of course, logical equivalence
is of no use for theories formulated in different signatures. For that case, we look to notions of
how a theory can define new concepts that do not occur in the original signature Σ. Recall that a
definitional extension T+ in Σ+ of the theory T in Σ is the result of adding new predicate symbols,
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function symbols, or constant symbols that can be defined by T in terms of formulas in the original
signature Σ. There is every reason, moreover, to think of a definitional extension T+ as equivalent
to the original theory T . Thus, two theories T1 (in Σ1) and T2 (in Σ2) are said to be definitionally
equivalent just in case there are definitional extensions T+i of Ti in Σ1 ∪Σ2 (for i = 1, 2) such that
T+1 is logically equivalent to T
+
2 .
Nonetheless, there are reasons to think that definitional equivalence is not the most fruit-
ful notion of equivalence between theories. One such reason is that it doesn’t match well with
the notions of equivalence between the corresponding syntactic categories (two theories can have
equivalent syntactic categories without being definitionally equivalent). Another reason is that def-
initional equivalence cannot capture the sense in which, for example, the theory of categories can
be equivalently formulated using objects and arrows, or just with arrows. In order to capture these
intuitive verdicts of equivalence, the most plausible idea is Morita equivalence, which allows for
equivalence of theories formulated not only in different signatures but also in different signatures
with different sorts.
The notion of “Morita equivalence” of theories has two independent sources.4 On the one hand,
Morita equivalence is suggested by ideas from categorical logic, in particular from topos theory. To
see this, recall that the pretopos completion P (C) of a coherent category C can be described in the
following equivalent ways:
1. P (C) is the result of freely adjoining finite coproducts and coequalizers of equivalence relations
to C (see Johnstone, 2002, A1.4).
2. P (C) is the subcategory of coherent objects in the topos Sh(C) of sheaves on C, where the
site C is equipped with the coherent Grothendieck topology.
Recall also that the classifying topos ET of the theory T is the unique (up to categorical equivalence)
topos that contains a model of T , and such that any model of T in another topos E uniquely lifts
to a geometric morphism from ET into E (see MacLane and Moerdijk, 2012, p. 561 and Makkai and
Reyes, 1977, p. 272).
Now two coherent theories S and T are said to be Morita equivalent (in the categorical sense)
just in case the following equivalent conditions hold (see Johnstone, 2002).
4The name “Morita equivalence” originates in module theory, and was transmitted into category theory through
the study of algebraic theories.
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1. The classifying toposes ES and ET are equivalent.
2. The pretoposes PS and PT are equivalent.
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The equivalence between these two statements follows from the fact that ET ' Sh(CT ) ' Sh(PT ).
Moreover, it follows from the second fact that if CT is equivalent to CS , then S and T are Morita
equivalent. To see that the converse is not true, it suffices to display a theory T such that its
syntactic category CT is not a pretopos. Such theories are easy to find (see Example 1 below).
In a completely unrelated development, ideas related to Morita equivalence began to spring up
in the works of logicians. As noted by Harnik (2011), Shelah’s T eq construction (also known as
“elimination of imaginaries”) is closely related to the pretopos completion construction. Indeed,
the pretopos completion PT of a theory CT is the same thing as the syntactic category of T
eq,
i.e. Shelah’s construction applied to T . Similarly, Andre´ka et al. (2001) generalize the notion of
a definitional extension so as to include the possibility of defining new sort symbols. We refer the
reader to those works to see the original motivations for moving to a more expansive notion of
equivalence between theories.
But what exactly does this all mean at the level of syntax? As has been explained by Barrett
and Halvorson (2015b) and Tsementzis (2015), the ideas about Morita equivalence coming from
topos theory correspond to a completely natural generalization of the idea of having a common
definitional extension. In particular, given a theory T in signature Σ, a Morita extension T+ of
T can be constructed either by defining new relation and/or function symbols, or by defining new
sorts from the sorts of Σ. The operation of defining new sorts via T corresponds roughly to taking
the pretopos completion of CT . Thus, intuitively speaking, two theories T and T
′ are Morita
equivalent just in case T can define all the sorts, relation symbols, etc. of T ′, and vice versa, in a
compatible fashion.6 And in fact it can be shown that two theories are Morita equivalent in the
syntactic sense just in case the pretopos completions of their syntactic categories are equivalent
– see (Tsementzis, 2015, Theorem 4.7). This merely expresses the fact that the syntactic notion
of Morita equivalence developed in (Barrett and Halvorson, 2015b) coincides with – and therefore
characterizes – the topos-theoretic notion defined in (Johnstone, 2002). This justifies our free use
of the same term “Morita equivalence” to refer to both notions.
5Here we use PT to abbreviate P (CT ), the pretopos completion of the syntactic category of T .
6For an example of how this “definitional” understanding of Morita equivalence can be applied to issues of theo-
retical equivalence in physics, see the discussion on classical mechanics in (Teh and Tsementzis, 2015).
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Clearly if two syntactic categories CT and CT ′ are equivalent, then T and T
′ are Morita equiv-
alent. The converse, however, is not true.
Example 1. An easy way to see this is to take the an empty two-sorted theory T , i.e. the theory
with no axioms whose signature Σ consists only of two sort symbols σ1, σ2. Then we can extend T
to T ′ by adding a “coproduct sort” σ1 + σ2 together with function symbols ρ1:σ1 → σ1 + σ2 and
ρ2:σ2 → σ1 + σ2 and axioms defining σ1 + σ2 as a “coproduct” with ρ1 and ρ2 as its coprojections.
Indeed T ′ is exactly a Morita extension of T in the sense of (Barrett and Halvorson, 2015b) which
means that T and T ′ are Morita equivalent. However, the syntactic categories CT and CT ′ cannot be
equivalent: the obvious embedding CT ↪→ CT ′ is full and faithful but there can be no isomorphism
from {z:σ1 + σ2.>} to any object of CT (regarded as a full subcategory of CT ′). (Given the
results of Tsementzis (2015), this is also an example of two theories which have equivalent pretopos
completions but inequivalent syntactic categories.) y
As such, we are left with two distinct notions of equivalence between theories T and T ′:
(SE) Equivalence of their syntactic categories, i.e. CT ' CT ′
(ME) Morita Equivalence
For reasons too detailed to go into here, we believe that (SE), although weaker than logical equiv-
alence, is still too strong a notion. As noted above, (SE) is a sufficient condition for (ME) to hold,
but not a necessary one. There is a strong sense in which (ME) captures exactly the right content
of a theory as long as we care about that theory only up to the structure of its category of models.
In order to clarify this remark, we must now go on to to say a few more words about this category
of models.
1.3 The semantic category
We have already noted that there is a second category associated with a theory T , namely the
category Mod(T ) of its models. We will call Mod(T ) the semantic category associated with T .
Before proceeding, let’s be more precise about what we mean by the category of models of T .
The objects of this category are simply set-valued models of T , in the sense of Tarski. But what
are the arrows of the semantic category? There are two possible choices:
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• Let T be a theory in signature Σ. We let Mod(T ) denote the category whose objects are
Σ-structures that satisfy T , and whose arrows are homomorphisms of Σ-structures. Recall
that if M and N are Σ-structures, then a homomorphism j : M → N is a function that
preserves the extensions of symbols in Σ. That is, for each relation symbol r ∈ Σ,
j(rM ) ⊆ rN , (1)
and so on.
In contrast to the definition found in most model theory textbooks, we do not require the
map j to be one-to-one, nor do we require equality in (1). The reason we don’t impose these
requirements is because they are unmotivated when the logic at hand doesn’t have a negation
symbol (as in the case of coherent logic).
For example, if Σ = {◦, e}, and if T is the theory of groups (written in Σ), then the notion of
a homomorphism of Σ-structures is simply the notion of a group homomorphism.
• We let Mode(T ) denote the category whose objects are (again) Σ-structures that satisfy T ,
and whose arrows are elementary embeddings of Σ-structures. Recall that if M and N are Σ-
structures, then an elementary embedding j : M → N is a function that preserves extensions
of all Σ-formulas. That is, for any formula φ(~x) of Σ, and for any n-tuple ~a of elements of M ,
M |= φ(~a) =⇒ N |= φ(j(~a)). (2)
In particular, for any sentence φ of Σ,
M |= φ =⇒ N |= φ. (3)
We can think of Mod(T ) as the “thick” category of models (more arrows) and Mode(T ) as the
“thin” category of models (fewer arrows) of T . Note that Mode(T ) is a subcategory of Mod(T ), and
typically a proper subcategory.7 For example, let Σ be a signature with one sort and no non-logical
vocabulary, and let T be the empty theory in Σ, i.e. the theory whose models are bare sets. Let mi
7Indeed, Mode(T ) = Mod(T ) if and only if every first-order formula φ (over the signature Σ of T ) is T -provably
equivalent to a coherent formula (over classical logic) – see Johnstone (2002, Proposition 3.4.9).
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be a model of T with i elements. Then Mod(T ) has an arrow j : m1 → m2, whereas Mode(T ) has
no such arrow (since elementary embeddings preserve the truth-value of numerical statements).
There are several questions one can ask of the relation between thin and thick categories. A
well-known fact – alluded to above – is that the thin category of a full first-order theory is always
equivalent to the thick category of a coherent theory, called its Morleyization – see (Johnstone, 2002,
Lemma D1.5.13). There are also many natural open questions ripe for investigation regarding the
relationship between thick and thin categories. We will mention some of them in the following
section.
But for now, the most important point of this subsection is that Mod(T ), and a fortiori
Mode(T ), is not generally an adequate representative of the theory T . This means that even
the thick categories of models are not “thick enough”. To be more precise, the passage from T to
Mod(T ) loses information in the sense that neither T , nor a theory T ′ that is Morita equivalent to
T , can be reconstructed from Mod(T ). Examples from propositional logic makes this fact clear.
Example 2. For full first-order theories, there is an intuitive example. Let Σ be the propositional
logic signature with symbols p0, p1, . . .. Let T1 be the empty theory in Σ, and let T2 be the theory
with axioms p0 ` pi for all i ∈ N. Clearly T1 and T2 are not Morita equivalent theories. And yet,
the semantic categories Mod(T1) and Mod(T2) are equivalent — since both are discrete, and have
2ℵ0 objects. Thus, T1 and T2 are inequivalent theories whose semantic categories are equivalent
(see Halvorson, 2012, p. 191). y
Example 3. For coherent theories, coming up with examples requires a bit more algebraic ground-
work. Up to Morita equivalence, a coherent propositional theory is the same thing as the theory
of prime filters of a (unique up to isomorphism) distributive lattice (see Johnstone, 2002, Remark
D1.4.14). Given any such distributive lattice B the category of models of the corresponding theory
can then be identified with the spectrum of B. And if B is Boolean (as a lattice) then its spectrum
will be discrete. This means that up to equivalence of their categories of S-models we can only
recover a coherent propositional theory up to the cardinality of its spectrum. However, there are
many examples of non-isomorphic Boolean lattices whose spectra have equal cardinalities. Indeed
a similar idea as our previous example works again here. Let B1 be the Boolean algebra generated
by a countably infinite number of elements p0, p1, . . . and let B2 be the Boolean algebra generated
by the same elements plus the relation p0 ≤ pi for all i ∈ N. B1 is atomless whereas B2 has an atom
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and therefore B1 and B2 cannot be isomorphic. However, the cardinality of both their spectrums
is equal to 2ℵ0 a fact which can be seen by noting that homomorphisms B1 → 2 correspond exactly
to homomorphisms φ:B2 → 2 such that φ(p0) = 0. y
The lesson here is that the semantic category of a theory — i.e. the models of that theory, and
homomorphisms between models — generally contains less information than the theory itself does.
A fortiori, the class of models of a theory contains less information than the theory itself does.
(And this is what’s wrong with the original semantic view of theories.)
It is completely natural to ask: if Mod(T ) does not contain the same amount of information
as T , then what information or structure must be added to Mod(T ) in order to recover T? Think
of the question this way: Mod(T ) is a collection of models and arrows between models, including
automorphisms (i.e. arrows from a model to itself). What other information about Mod(T ) can be
extracted from the theory T?
A classic answer to this question was given (for the propositional case) by Marshall Stone.
Stone noted that T implicitly contains topological information about Mod(T ). In particular, let’s
say that a sequence m1,m2,m3, . . . of models in Mod(T ) converges to a model m0 just in case for
any sentence φ of Σ, the truth value mi(φ) is eventually equal to m0(φ). This notion of convergence
defines a topology on Mod(T ). Letting Mod(T ) denote the corresponding topological space, Stone’s
duality theorem establishes the following:
Theorem (Stone Duality). The collection of compact open subsets of Mod(T ) forms a Boolean
lattice that is equivalent, as a category, to CT .
In other words, from Mod(T ) we can reconstruct T up to its syntactic category, i.e. up to (SE).
Thus, in the case of propositional theories, the topological semantic category Mod(T ) contains as
much information as T .
But what now about the case of predicate logic? Here the situation is complicated by the fact
that there are typically many non-trivial arrows between models. Can the category Mod(T ) still be
supplemented with topological information in order to recover T? The answer here is: Yes, sort of.
Although there is still no result that perfectly generalizes Stone Duality, some important partial
results have been obtained by Makkai (1991) and Awodey and Forssell (2013).
Of course, philosophers of science should be eager to understand these duality results because
of the important lesson they teach about the collection of models of a theory:
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The category of models Mod(T ) of a theory T does not generally contain all the in-
formation that is contained in the original theory T . The content of T might include
information, e.g., about topological relations between models.
Let’s rephrase that moral one more time, now trying to make it absolutely clear as a friendly
amendment to the semantic view of theories:
The mathematical content of a scientific theory T is not exhausted by the class of models
of T .
Obviously, this moral from first-order logic doesn’t generalize directly to scientific theories in the
wild (e.g. classical mechanics, general relativity, quantum mechanics). However, the results from
first-order categorical logic strongly suggest that in the case of scientific theories, we would similarly
go wrong if we identified the mathematical content of a theory T with its category Mod(T ) of
models8 — for the theory might make use of further structures on Mod(T ), perhaps topological
(as in general relativity), or measure-theoretic (as in statistical mechanics), or perhaps some sort
of monoidal or tensor structure (as in quantum mechanics and quantum field theory). For some
evidence for this claim, with reference to specific scientific theories, see (Curiel, 2014) or (Fletcher,
2015), and for some related discussion see (Lal and Teh, 2015).
1.4 On Methodology
A few more remarks are now in order concerning the big-picture methodology that we are envision-
ing and category theory’s role in it. We do not want to fall into the trap — all too common in 20th
century philosophy — of being blinded by the glow of a shiny new piece of formal apparatus. We
are fully aware that, from a mathematical point of view, a syntactic category is regarded merely as
8An important clarification: when we say here that we would go wrong if we identified the mathematical content
of a theory T with its semantic category Mod(T ), recall that this means the semantic category over the category
of sets S. So what we are saying here is that a theory cannot be recovered up to (ME) from its category of
models in S. Nevertheless, conceptual completeness for coherent logic (see Johnstone (2002, Theorem D3.5.9)) says
that this is very close to being true: equivalence of the semantic categories of T and T ′ does imply (ME) as long
as this equivalence is induced by an interpretation I of T into T ′ at the level of syntax (i.e. a coherent functor
I:PT → PT ′). Relatedly, there is another sense in which a theory T is actually recoverable up to (ME) from its
semantic category: if we consider semantic categories over arbitrary Grothendieck toposes E and stipulate that the
equivalence E−Mod(T ) ' E−Mod(T ′) is natural in E , then from this alone we can conclude that T and T ′ are Morita
equivalent. This means that the extra structure that we need to place on Mod(T ) (understood as the category of
S-models) in order to recover T up to Morita equivalence corresponds exactly to the requirement of naturality in the
class of Grothendieck toposes.
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a technical device useful for proving other results, e.g. completeness theorems.9 Yet we believe that
the conceptual value of the kind of formal apparatus best encapsulated by the syntactic category
of a theory goes beyond its practical use within mathematics. The syntactic category is a formal
construction realizing a possible synthesis of an opposition that — under different guises — has
occupied philosophy throughout its history: that between syntax and semantics. This opposition
has proved especially vexing in the philosophy of science as we saw in the above-summarized debate
between the syntactic and the semantic views of theories. Category theory provides a resolution of
the syntax/semantics opposition (understood formally) in the form of the syntactic category.10 It
would be shallow at best and narrow-minded at worst for the philosophy of science not to attempt
to draw lessons from category theory’s successes in this manner. To be sure, these successes take
place in a very “sterilized” mathematical setting dealing with first-order theories that have little
in common with the wild, unaxiomatized mathematical beasts that physicists contend with. Un-
like W.v.O. Quine, we have no ideological commitment to regimenting theories in first-order logic.
Rather, we see first-order logic as providing a manageable testing ground for more general ideas
about theoretical structure.
What we are saying here clearly amounts to a methodology based on an analogy between
the categorical metamathematics of first-order theories and the philosophy of scientific theories.11
Category theory brings to the table new constructions and concepts with which to study the
metamathematics of first-order theories. We ask: can these concepts carry over to the philosophy
of science in any fruitful sense? Put less modestly: can category-theoretic thinking about first-order
theories re-invigorate (perhaps even overhaul) philosophical thinking about scientific theories? We
are convinced that it can.
All this raises some broader issues on the very relationship between formal mathematical work
and philosophy. Let us make a few brief remarks here on how we envision this relationship (which
may betray a not entirely uncontroversial view of philosophical methodology). At its best, philoso-
phy advances by appropriating new vocabularies (or “concepts”) and deploying them to old tasks.
It is certainly constrained in this process of appropriation by some kind of universal (or “transcen-
9And this extends to syntax very far removed from first-order logic, e.g. the metamathematics of simple type
theories or of Martin-Lo¨f type theories are also studied via structure-bearing syntactic categories.
10Inspired, it has to be said, by Lindenbaum-Tarski-style constructions that predate it.
11If one finds oneself in a particularly optimistic mood, one might hope that the analogy carries over even to the
study of theories of metaphysics, i.e. to what now goes under the name of metametaphysics.
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dental”) logic, i.e. a universal form that constrains this process in just the right way to guarantee
its meaning. Other than that, however, we believe that every realm of discourse is fair game for
philosophical appropriation — and this is especially true of mathematics and the natural sciences.
Contrary to how this dictum has been interpreted across large swathes of analytic philosophy, this
does not mean, for us, that the assertions of mathematics and the natural sciences are to be taken
as the immovable datum around which philosophy must somehow build a niche for itself. Rather,
thorough knowledge of mathematics and the natural sciences are fruitful for philosophy not so that
we know what these scientists assert but rather how these scientists think and especially what kind
of thinking has proved fruitful and useful to them. Philosophy is not to be reduced to formal work;
rather, formal work is to provide the canvas on which philosophy is to be painted. It is in this spirit
that we take formal work to be essential to the philosophical enterprise.
We believe that category-theoretic thinking and category theory are ripe for philosophical ap-
propriation (in the above-described spirit). As clarified in the beginning, this does not mean that
we are claiming that category theory is the right way to think about this or that phenomenon.
Our hope, rather, is that category theory will allow us to see old problems under a new light and
hopefully give rise to new forms of thinking in the process. Initially this process may appear as
working by (unfounded) analogy, viz. that between the categorical metamathematics of first-order
theories and the philosophy of scientific theories. Surely, one might object, this analogy requires
substantiation. Otherwise, what is there to stop one from accusing us (with a hint of irony) of
making a category mistake?
To this we have two things to say. Firstly, our formal work is constrained by mathematical
criteria: it is – one might say – mathematical work done with philosophical goals in mind. This
provides some minimal protection from nonsense and contradiction even if the analogy we purport
to rely on proves shaky or unconvincing. Secondly, we believe that the burden of proof is not
with us. It is our accuser who would have to provide some proof that formal work in mathematics
is altogether unsuitable to serve as a philosophical canvas. The bond between mathematics and
philosophy has always been strong (at least in the modern era). Leibniz, for example, thought
that he could rely on the new science of the analysis of infinitessimals as a conceptual guide to
his sought-after characteristica universalis and Leibniz was certainly no fool. In a Leibnizian (and
therefore overly optimistic) spirit we similarly feel confident in taking our conceptual cues from
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mathematics and especially – for the present purposes – from category theory.
But, as a reminder, this does not mean that we take the mathematics of category theory to
reveal some essential truth about scientific theories. Nor do we take category theory to help us in
the process of extracting from the viewpoint of theories-as-categories a sharper vision of what it
means to be a scientific theory. That is to say, we do not see the virtue of the categorical approach
to be that it adds one more layer of differentiation to all previously existing views (e.g. the naive
semantic view, the Carnapian view etc.) such that, in abstracting the common features of all of
them, we get an even sharper picture of the “essential nature” of a scientific theory. Rather, for
us, category theory adds one more layer of differentiation to our thinking about scientific theories –
and in doing so adds one more piece to the great unfolding puzzle of the exact relationship between
natural science and the reality it describes.12
As much respect as philosophy should accord mathematicians and scientists – and philosophers
should certainly try their best to understand the work of mathematicians and scientists – this
does not mean that philosophy should be reduced to compiling grocery lists to sate the ontological
appetites of science. Philosophers are engaged in their own creative work which feeds off from
mathematics and natural science (and many, if not all, disciplines) but is not governed by them. A
scientific approach to philosophy does not – in our mind – mean that philosophy is to be reduced to
scientific exposition. This is the spirit in which we urge philosophers – and especially philosophers
of science – to engage with category theory.
In summary, our work does not rely on the relationship between the philosophy of science and
the categorical metamathematics of first-order theories because, somehow, first-order theories are
to be thought of as adequate “toy models” of scientific theories. This may very well be the case
– and we certainly believe it to be the case – but our methodology does not rise or fall based on
this claim of adequacy. Rather, what we find in (not exclusively categorical) metamathematics is
the emergence of certain concepts, relations and oppositions that very much reflect those that the
philosophy of science also engages with. For example: the notion of a theory, the way it relates
to syntax, the way it relates to semantics, and the manner in which syntax and semantics are op-
12The manner in which we find the appropriation of formal work by philosophy fruitful can perhaps best be
summarized in Cassirer’s attitude to language: “the true universal ‘essence’ of language [is] no longer sought in
abstraction from differentiation, but in the totality of differentiations.” (Cassirer, 1953, p. 155) (To be perfectly
precise, Cassirer is here summarizing Humboldt’s views on language – but it is clear that he too endorses such a
view.)
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posed. Both philosophy of science and (not exclusively categorical) metamathematics deal with this
situation (where “theory”, “syntax” etc. are understood differently). In (exclusively) categorical
mathematics, the opposition between syntax and semantics is resolved through the construction of
the syntactic category. So the fact that there should be something like the “syntactic category”
of a scientific theory does not stem from a conviction in some essential similarity between first-
order theories and scientific theories. It stems, if anything, from the empirical observation that
the language and the concepts surrounding first-order theories in how they are studied metamath-
ematically (syntax, semantics etc.) is similar to the language and concepts surrounding scientific
theories in how they have been studied in the philosophy of science (at least from Carnap onwards).
It is this observation that grounds our conviction in the fruitfulness of the above-described appro-
priation of the categorical vocabulary – and it is this conviction that provides the impetus for the
kind of technical projects that we outline in the following section.
2 The category of theories
Let us now put the transcendental justification of our methodology to the side and return to
more practical questions: why should philosophers of science invest the time and effort in learning
category theory? What good is it to think of theories as categories? We claim that the primary
virtue of this approach is that it allows us to see theories themselves as the objects of a category:
the category of theories. We can then apply the tools of category theory to understanding the
structure of this larger category, how individual theories sit within it, and how theories are related
to each other.
As before, our initial focus is on the case of theories in first order logic. As described in the
previous section, each first-order theory T corresponds to a syntactic category CT (which we could
also take to be PT ). We let the collection of all such CT be the objects of a category Th, the
category of all first-order theories.
Again, we have some fine-grained control over the definition of the category Th of theories.
The main possibilities for Th are as follows:
• Coh the category of coherent categories (i.e. syntactic categories of coherent theories);
• dCoh the category of decidable coherent categories (cf. Awodey and Forssell, 2013);
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• BCoh the category of Boolean coherent categories (i.e. syntactic categories of first-order
theories over classical logic);
• Pretop the category of pretoposes.
These categories are arranged roughly as follows:
BCoh ⊆ dCoh ⊆ Coh
and
Pretop ⊆ Coh
where the subset symbol indicates a full inclusion of categories.
Choosing our “category of theories” from among these (or other) options clearly amounts to
choosing a notion of equivalence for our theories. Namely – as is usual in categorical thinking –
choosing where your objects of study live automatically determines what it means for your objects
of study to be “isomorphic”. This is an important point to keep in mind: choosing a notion of
equivalence for theories and choosing a “category of theories” are not two independent choices.
Choosing one determines the other – there is only one degree of freedom here.
In our opinion, the two most natural choices for Th are Coh or Pretop. This shouldn’t come
as a surprise: we’ve already said that the two notions of equivalence that interest us the most
are (SE) and (ME) and these correspond exactly to choosing Coh (for (SE)) and Pretop (for
(ME)) as our preferred categories of theories. This is because (SE) identifies theories with their
syntactic categories and every coherent category is the syntactic category of some coherent theory,
whereas (ME) identifies theories with the pretopos completion of their syntactic categories and
every pretopos can be seen to arise in this manner (although, of course, inequivalent coherent
categories may have equivalent pretopos completions). As to restricting ourselves to coherent logic
recall, in particular, the arguments of Makkai and Reyes to the effect that coherent logic is to be
preferred to full first-order logic.
Furthermore there is a natural relation between these two categories: for each coherent cat-
egory C, there is a unique pretopos P (C) and functor ηC : C → P (C) satisfying a suitable
universal property. In short: every coherent category has a unique pretopos completion — an
operation corresponding roughly to taking a “maximal Morita extension” of the original theory.
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In fact, P : Coh → Pretop is a 2-functor (see Makkai, 1987). And even more is true: Pretop
is “almost” a reflective sub-2-category of Coh. More precisely, Pretop is a full reflective sub-
2-category of FinSit, the 2-category of “finitary” sites (i.e. categories equipped with finitely-
generated Grothendieck topologies) – this is a special case of a far more general result proven by
Shulman (2012).
For the purposes of this paper, we needn’t make a decision about the precise definition of Th.
However, for concreteness, let us say that we are in favor of the identification Th = Pretop.
(As explained above, this means that we are effectively choosing (ME) as our preferred notion of
equivalence.) Although nothing we say here hinges on this choice, let us say a couple of things about
why it is a natural choice to make (other than our faith in (ME)). Firstly, there is a very precise
sense in which – from a logical point of view – the pretopos completion of a coherent category adds
only those concepts that are already definable from the coherent structure of the original category.
Secondly, the pretopos completion is the maximal such extension, i.e. it contains everything that is
definable from the coherent structure of a coherent category (for a precisification of this statement
see (Harnik, 2011)). As such, if one agrees with us that the initial syntactic presentation of a
theory does not constitute its essential content then moving from Coh to Pretop should seem a
very reasonable move to make.
Now what are the arrows in Pretop? Since the objects of Pretop are categories, the arrows
should be functors. Perhaps surprisingly, the arrows we care about in this particular case are
obtained by considering a pretopos as a coherent category (recall that every pretopos is coherent).
But do coherent categories have additional structure that ought to be preserved by our arrows? The
answer, in short, is yes: a coherent category has limits and colimits that encode various syntactic
structures — in particular, conjunction, disjunction, and existential quantification. Thus, we define
an arrow between pretoposes P and P ′ to be a coherent functor in the sense of (Johnstone, 2002,
p. 34), also called a logical functor in (Makkai and Reyes, 1977, p. 121). In short, we consider
Pretop as a full subcategory of Coh.13
13The fact that it is reasonable to do so essentially boils down to the above-mentioned fact that the pretopos
completion of a coherent category is “definable” (in a precise sense) from the coherent structure of the category
in question. In particular, even though coherent morphisms will not, in general, preserve arbitrary coproducts or
coequalizers, they will preserve binary coproducts and coequalizers arising from equivalence relations. This means
that “disjoint unions” and “quotients by equivalence relations” are concepts within the grasp of coherent logic and
taking the pretopos completion of a coherent category amounts to a (maximal) “definitional extension” of the original
coherent category by these definable concepts. Indeed, removing the scare quotes from the previous sentences and
making this way of talking about pretopos completions fully precise was one of the motivations behind (Barrett and
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Choosing coherent functors as arrows has the nice consequence that arrows from PT to PS
correspond to translations of the theory T into S (so do, incidentally, arrows from CT to CS). A
way to see this is the following: each PT contains the so-called generic model MT of T (Johnstone,
2002, Proposition D1.4.12.(ii)). This is a model of T taken in the pretopos completion PT (recall
that PT is coherent and therefore has the capacity to model any coherent theory T ). It is generic
in the sense that it satisfies exactly those sentences that are provable in T , i.e.
MT |= φ ⇐⇒ T ` φ.
Now, since coherent functors preserve the coherent structure and since models of coherent theories
in coherent categories are built using (only) that coherent structure, we have that any coherent
functor F :PT → D into a coherent category D will give us a model F (MT ) of T in D. In particular,
when D = PT ′ for some other theory T
′ then F (MT ) is a model of T in PT ′ . But a (S-)model of T ′
is simply a coherent functor from PT ′ into S. Therefore, any model G:PT ′ → S of T ′ will also give
rise to a model of T , viz. GF :PT → S. In plain terms: any model of T ′ contains a model of T ;
this is just another way of saying that there is a translation of T into T ′. Indeed, in (Pitts, 1989)
translations of a theory T into another theory T ′ are defined to be models of T in PT ′ .14 Finally, it
is important to note that everything we’ve said in this paragraph can be said pretty much verbatim
for syntactic categories themselves (rather than their pretopos completions). More on translations
and definability at the level of syntactic categories can be found in (Caramello, 2012).
It should immediately be pointed out that Pretop is most naturally thought of as a 2-category,
rather than just a category. Recall that a 2-category C is (roughly speaking) a category such
that for any two objects a, b of C, instead of C(a, b) being a set of arrows from a to b, it is a
category ; and the composition operation on arrows is functorial (see Borceux, 1994; Lack, 2010).
The arrows in the category C(a, b) are called 2-cells. The paradigm example of a 2-category is Cat,
the category of (small) categories, with functors as arrows, and natural transformations as 2-cells.
That is, if C and D are categories, then Cat(C,D) is the category whose objects are functors
F : C → D, and whose arrows are natural transformations between such functors. Similarly, we
define Pretop(P, P ′) to be the category whose objects are coherent functors from P to P ′, and
Halvorson, 2015b) and (Tsementzis, 2015).
14Which is the same thing as saying that translations are functors CT → PT ′ which in turn is the same thing as
saying that translations are functors PT → PT ′ .
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whose arrows (2-cells) are natural transformations.15
Basking in the full 2-categorical glory of Pretop is no mere pretension, nor is it a pointless
exercise to prepare us for the altitude sickness that comes with the ever steepening ascent towards
higher category theory. It is, rather, a perspective that brings, among other things, new purely
logical insights. To convince oneself of this one need look no further than Pitts’ proof of concep-
tual completeness for coherent logic (resp. intuitionistic logic) using the 2-categorical structure of
Pretop (resp. HPretop, the category of Heyting pretoposes) – see (Pitts, 1987, 1989).
Given this elegant formal framework, numerous technical questions — of philosophical interest
— suggest themselves. We will now list and discuss a few such questions.
1. We saw that if the syntactic categories CT and CS are equivalent, then the theories T and S
are Morita equivalent, i.e. that (SE) implies (ME). We also saw that the converse fails: two
theories can be Morita equivalent even even though their syntactic categories are inequivalent.
An interesting question we can now raise is this: What kind of conditions can we place on
theories such that (SE) coincides with (ME)? (One well-known case in which they do coincide
is that of algebraic theories.) Furthermore, what can we say about Morita equivalences over
particular categories? For example, for any two first-order theories T and T ′ whose semantic
categories are equivalent (over S, and not necessarily naturally) how can we characterize their
relation from a purely syntactic standpoint? And what about their thin categories? Namely,
if
S−Mode(T ) ' S−Mode(T ′)
then – purely syntactically – how are T and T ′ related?
2. Let’s consider some natural relations between theories. First, let T be a theory in signature
Σ, and let T ′ be an extension of T by some additional axioms, also in the language Σ (such
“extensions” are also called “quotients”). Then there will be a canonical functor F : CT →
CT ′ . What can we say about this functor? What features does it have? In the case of
geometric theories a lot of work in this area has been done by O. Caramello starting with the
“Duality Theorem” in her Phd thesis – for a big picture view see (Caramello, 2009, 2010).
See also (Forssell, 2013).
15A 2-category is a “strict” version of a bicategory in the sense of (Be´nabou, 1967).
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Similarly, let T be a theory in signature Σ, and let T ′ be the same theory, but considered in
a larger signature Σ′. Again there will be a canonical functor F : CT → CT ′ . What features
does this functor have?
Furthermore, philosophers of science have been interested in questions about when one theory
T ′ is reducible to another theory T . Can reduction be thought of as a functor F : CT ′ → CT
(see Van Benthem and Pearce, 1984)? How does this functorial account compare to the
classical Nagelian account (see Nagel, 1979, Ch 11)? How does this functorial account compare
to semantic accounts (see Bickle, 1998)?
3. If we were to think of Coh or Pretop as merely a category, then a natural technical question
might be: does this category have limits? Or, does this category have colimits? And, if it does
have limits or colimits, then do these have any sort of natural interpretation as operations
on theories? For example, is there any sense in which a coproduct of two coherent categories
represents a sort of amalgamation of the two theories? And if so, does the notion of an
“amalgamation of theories” have a clear interpretation?
However, it’s more natural to think of either Coh or Pretop as a 2-category, in which case
the better questions have to do with the existence of limits and colimits in the bicategorical
sense. Does Pretop have 2-limits and 2-colimits? And if it does, do these limits and colimits
have a natural interpretation as operations on theories?16
Philosophers of science should be particularly interested in whether the categorical structure of
Pretop can be used to explicate various relations between theories, such as limiting relations.
4. The relation between “thick” and “thin” semantic categories provides very fertile ground for
investigation, as noted above. One obstruction here is that the thin semantic categories of
first-order theories are almost invariably “too thin” in the sense that they rarely contain
interesting categorical structure (e.g. limits, colimits etc.)
On the other hand, it is perhaps worth investigating relations between pairs of theories (T1, T2)
such that there are interesting functors
F : Mode(T1)→ Mod(T2)
16Makkai (1995) proves a version of the Craig interpolation theorem using the 2-categorical version of a pushout
of syntactic categories.
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where T1 would be thought of as the “background spacetime” theory and T2 would be thought
of as the “physical system theory”. To be a little more specific, this formal situation seems to
us an interesting generalization of the nowadays very common situation (e.g. with (Q)FTs)
where we have a category of “state spaces” represented by algebraic objects (e.g. Hilbert
spaces, C∗-algebras) and a category of “spacetimes” understood as categories of “physical
spacetimes with embeddings as arrows” and where a theory of physics is defined as a functor
relating those two.
For example, Fewster (2015) defines a locally covariant theory to be a functor
F :Bkgnd→ Phys .
In Fewster’s set-up, Bkgnd seems to us to be best understood as essentially the thin category
of models of some theory, since the morphisms are basically elementary embeddings (see
Fewster, 2015, p. 4). On the other hand, the categories which he calls Phys seem to us to
be best understood as the thick categories of models of some theory, since they are usually
categories of algebraic structures.
So perhaps it’s worth looking at what kind of interesting things can be said about such
functors, when T1 and T2 are first-order theories: what can we say about them, modulo some
constraints on T1, T2 and F? Is this a fruitful general set-up with which to study properties
of (Q)FTs?
5. The (2-)category Pretop might be used to explicate the notion of a symmetry of a theory.
In recent literature in philosophy of science, discussion of symmetries has not been technically
well controlled. Motivated perhaps by the semantic view of theories (see more below), these
discussions typically suppose that a symmetry operates on the class of models, or on the
set of solutions to an equation — with almost no attention to formal constraints on such
mappings. We should be clear, however, that there are both syntactic and semantic notions
of symmetries — as can be made precise with the category Th of theories (understood here
as Pretop). Let T be a theory and let PT be its syntactic category, which is an object of
Th.17 Then we propose:
17A note of clarification on terminology: we are now using the term “syntactic category” to refer to an arbitrary
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A syntactic symmetry of T is an auto-equivalence of the syntactic category PT .
Recall that a coherent functor F : PT → PS corresponds to a translation from T into S.
Thus, an auto-equivalence F : PT → PT corresponds to a translation of T into itself (i.e. a
sort of permutation of the vocabulary of T ).
But more is true. A coherent functor F : PT → PS induces a functor F ∗ : Mod(S)→ Mod(T )
from models of S to models of T (see Gajda et al., 1987; Makkai and Reyes, 1977). In
particular, an automorphism F : PT → PT induces a functor F ∗ : Mod(T )→ Mod(T ) on the
category of models of T , which raises another technical question:
Is it true that any essentially invertible functor G : Mod(T ) → Mod(T ) has the
feature that G = F ∗ for some coherent functor F : PT → PT ?
The answer to this question is No, as can be seen by again looking at the example of the two
propositional theories. Thus, philosophers of science should not necessarily suppose that any
auto-equivalence G : Mod(T ) → Mod(T ) should count as a symmetry of T . But can we say
something about further conditions on G so that it is indeed dual to some functor F on the
syntactic category PT ?
6. Since the demise of the syntactic view of theories, philosophers of science have been fond of
pointing out that interesting scientific theories — even those in rigorous mathematical physics
— typically fail to admit a first-order axiomatization. Thus, we might conclude that a typical
scientific theory cannot be described by an object in Coh or Pretop. We already dealt with
this point in Section 1.4 from a more abstract perspective. Let us now add a few more words.
Firstly, is this dismissal too fast? Note that some logics stronger than first-order logic —
e.g. geometric logic, or even higher-order logics — will also give rise to syntactic categories
that are coherent. In fact, if a logic is stronger than first-order logic, then the corresponding
categories can be expected to have more structure than coherent categories. For example,
in the case of intuitionistic type theory (ITT), there is a syntactic category CITT (produced
by a similar but different process than the one we outlined for first-order theories T ) which
bears the structure of an elementary topos (see (Lambek and Scott, 1986) for the classical
account).
object of the category of theories Th rather than the explicit construction as carried out in Section 1.1.
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Relatedly, recent work in “cohesive” homotopy type theory (CoHoTT) uses syntactic methods
(based on a logic much more “exotic” than first-order logic) to study higher gauge theories (see
(Schreiber, 2013) as well as (Corfield, 2016) in this volume). Among other things, Schreiber
envisions a certain class of ∞-toposes (the so-called “cohesive” ones) as the correct setting
at which to study the foundations of higher gauge theories, exactly because these cohesive
∞-toposes are (conjectured to be) the syntactic categories of CoHoTT. Of course, Schreiber’s
use of syntactic methods is not motivated by considerations on theoretical equivalence and
the structure of scientific theories – his mathematical work is carried out with the explicit
goal of articulating a general foundation for higher gauge theories. Nevertheless, the way in
which he blends syntactic and semantic methods is a great illustration, in our opinion, of how
representing scientific theories as categories (in his case higher categories) is an illuminating
perspective to take.
So, is being a coherent category a minimal necessary condition for representing a bona fide
scientific theory? In any case, it would be natural to ask:
Given a formalized theory T of the empirical sciences, is there some category CT
that can be thought of as the “syntactic category” of T?
Consider a couple of examples. First, let T be Einstein’s general theory of relativity. We
do have some sense of what the semantic category — i.e. the category of models of T —
ought to be, viz. the category of differentiable manifolds with Lorentzian metric and stress-
energy tensor satisfying Einstein’s field equations. But is there a category CT that could be
considered the syntactic category of GTR?18 And could the failure to distinguish between
semantic and syntactic points of view be partially responsible for some of the difficulties that
philosophers have had understanding the nature of symmetries in GTR?
As a second example, let T be quantum mechanics. In this case we also have a sense of what
the semantic category of T ought to be — namely, the category of (finite-dimensional) Hilbert
spaces and linear operators. (This example was one of the main motivators for the semantic
view, at least in the mind of van Fraassen.) Now, what might the syntactic category CT of T
look like? Is there a way to present quantum mechanics syntactically? Should we expect CT
18One might hope for some help here from investigations in synthetic differential geometry. See, for example,
(Reyes, 2009).
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to be something like a symmetric monoidal category instead of a coherent category? (Perhaps
some help here might come from recent work in categorical quantum logic, see e.g. Coecke and
Kissinger, 2016.) Note, finally, the importance of finding a syntactic presentation of quantum
mechanics: following Quine’s dictum that, “to be is to be the value of a variable,” to find
a syntactic presentation of quantum mechanics is tantamount to explicating the ontology of
that theory.
7. One of the complaints that van Fraassen — among several others — raised against the syntac-
tic view of theories was that it couldn’t make sense of the notions of empirical adequacy and
empirical equivalence (see Van Fraassen, 1980). In contrast, it was claimed that a semantic
approach to theoretical structure provided the resources to explicate these notions.
To be honest, we doubt the claim that the semantic view has an advantage in this regard.
However, the categorical approach provides new insight into the structure of theories. Might
it be useful for articulating these notions that are so important to an empiricist philosophy
of science?
Recall that the simplistic method of isolating empirical content of a theory T ran as such:
given the signature Σ, suppose that Σ = Σt ∪ Σo, where Σt contains theoretical terms, and
Σo contains observation terms. Then the empirical content of T is simply T |Σo , i.e. the
consequences of T in the subvocabulary Σo.
This method of isolating empirical content leads to absurdities, as noted by Achinstein, Put-
nam, van Fraassen and others. But can some version of it be revived by thinking in terms
of a syntactic category? In particular, suppose that C is a coherent category, representing
some theory T . Now suppose that C = Ct unionsqCo, i.e. C is the coproduct of two other coherent
categories.19 Might this sort of division be a way of representing the empirical content of
C? Could it overcome the objections that were leveled by the critics of the syntactic view of
theories?
Or perhaps there is some other way of representing empirical content? Perhaps an empirical
theory should be thought of as a pair of categories (C,D), where C is the syntactic category
(as before), and D is the “category of predictions”; and perhaps some relation between C
19Technically, the more appropriate notion here is a 2-coproduct.
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and D should be required.
But the most important test of these categorical ideas will be whether they can make sense
of actual empirical theories. On the one hand, the simplistic method of isolating empirical
content — via writing a signature as Σ = Σt ∪ Σo — is useless when applied to all but the
most trivial empirical theories. For example, even a theory as mathematically rigorous as
General Relativity doesn’t have an obvious “language,” and so it’s not clear how to represent
its empirical content syntactically. On the other hand, the semantic approach to empirical
content is so vague that no results of any interest have been proven about it (or at least, not
to our knowledge). We should hope that a categorical approach to these issues will both be
flexible enough to apply to actual theories, and will be precise enough to allow interesting
results to be proven.
3 On the duality of syntax and semantics
Recall that the logical positivists hoped to provide an explication for the notion of a scientific
theory.20 That is, they hoped to be able to say that a scientific theory is a certain sort of (rigorously
defined) mathematical object. But what kind of object? According to the earliest proposals (by
Carnap and others), a theory is a set of sentences in a formal language. This proposal and its later
elaborations have come to be known as the syntactic view of theories.
As is well known, the syntactic view of theories was subjected to severe criticism in the later
20th century. The consensus in the 1970s was the the syntactic view couldn’t be salvaged, and
required a wholesale replacement. The proposed replacement was the so-called semantic view of
theories, which claims that a scientific theory is a collection of models — perhaps the models of
some first-order logical theory, or perhaps a collection of models of some more general sort.21
It has long been thought that the semantic view of theories has many advantages over the
syntactic views – see e.g. the works of Suppe, van Fraassen, and Lloyd, et al.. Of course, that
claim presupposes that there is a genuine dilemma of choice between the two points of view. Only a
couple of isolated philosophers have suggested that this might be a false dilemma (see e.g. Friedman,
20For further elaboration of this story, see (Halvorson, 2015).
21To be clear, Van Fraassen (2014) has recently pointed out that for him, a theory is a class of models together with
representational content. However, for this discussion, we are concerned only with the mathematically representable
part of a theory.
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1982). In this section, we survey mathematical results that argue for a formal duality between the
syntactic and semantic points of view. We also propose that this duality could be exploited in order
to better understand the structure of scientific theories.
Recall the previous discussion of Stone duality for theories in propositional logic. While it’s not
true that a propositional theory can be reconstructed from its category of models alone (i.e. the
set of ultrafilters on the Lindenbaum algebra), it can be reconstructed from the category of models
plus relevant topological information.
In recent years, logicians have attempted to generalize Stone duality to the case of full first-order
logic. And while the results to date are only partial, they all point in a similar direction.22
First, Makkai (1991) makes use of an insight from  Los’ theorem: if {mi}i∈I are models of a theory
T , then so is an ultraproduct
∏
i∈I mi/U , where U is an ultrafilter on I. What’s more, in the case
where T is a propositional theory, the ultraproduct
∏
i∈I mi/U is simply the Stone topology limit
of the sequence {mi}i∈I along the ultrafilter U . In other words, in the propositional case the Stone
topology on Mod(T ) can be alternatively described as “ultraproduct structure” on Mod(T ); and
the relevant functors F : Mod(T ) → Mod(T ′) are those that preserve this ultraproduct structure
(i.e. that are continuous in the Stone topology).
Now Makkai defines an ultracategory to be a category with a sort of ultraproduct structure (see
Makkai, 1991). Of course, the motivating example of an ultracategory is the category Mod(T ) of
models of a first-order theory. Then the question arises:
Can a theory T be reconstructed from the corresponding ultracategory Mod(T )?
Makkai shows that the answer is Yes. For any pretopos P , let Θ(P ) = Coh(P,S) denote the cate-
gory of coherent functors from P into the category S of sets (i.e. models of the theory corresponding
to P ). Makkai shows that there is another functor Γ : UCat→ Pretopop, such that (Γ ◦Θ)(P ) is
equivalent to P . Stated more generally: there is a pair of adjoint functors as follows:
Pretopop UCat
Θ
Γ
22Such dualities as the ones we will outline below sometimes go under the name of “Isbell Duality” and many
examples have been studied at a very high level of generality – see Porst and Tholen (1991) and Barr et al. (2008)
for a sampling.
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Unfortunately, this adjunction is not an equivalence of categories, as in the case of propositional
theories (i.e. Stone duality for Boolean algebras). In particular, not every ultracategory is of
the form Mod(T ) ' Coh(PT ,S), for some first-order theory T . In slogan form: there are more
ultracategories than there are coherent theories.
A more recent attempt to generalize Stone duality has been undertaken by Awodey and Forssell
(2013). Here the insight comes not from model theory (as in the case of Makkai’s ultraproducts),
but from topos theory. Recall that Joyal and Tierney (1984) proved that for every Grothendieck
topos E , there is a localic groupoid G such that E ' B(G), where B(G) is the topos of continuous
actions of G. It was also shown by Butz and Moerdijk (1998) that when E has enough points —
as is the case when E ' ET is the classifying topos of a coherent theory — then G may be taken to
be a topological groupoid.23
The models of a (coherent) theory T naturally form a category Mod(T ). Now, if we eliminate
all non-isomorphism arrows from Mod(T ), then the resulting category Modi(T ) is a groupoid, i.e.
a category in which every arrow has a two-sided inverse. Intuitively speaking, Modi(T ) is the
category of models of T and their symmetries (i.e. automorphisms).
Since Mod(T ) doesn’t contain enough information to reconstruct T , a fortiori Modi(T ) doesn’t
contain enough information to reconstruct T . To reiterate, a theory’s models and their automor-
phisms do not tell us everything about that theory! But now the insight of Awodey and Forssell was
that if Modi(T ) is equipped with an appropriate topology, then the resulting topological groupoid
G, could be the very G that appears in the representation theorem of Butz and Moerdijk. To be
more precise, if CT is the syntactic category of T , and if Sh(CT ) is the topos of sheaves on CT ,
then
Sh(CT ) ' B(GT ),
where GT is the topological groupoid of models of T , and B(GT ) is the Grothendieck topos of
continuous actions of GT . Furthermore, since the pretopos completion of CT can be recovered as
23Roughly, locales are topological spaces without a notion of a point, axiomatized instead with a primitive notion
of a neighborhood and lattice operations on such neighborhoods (corresponding to unions and intersections). The
advantage of locales is that they are amenable to a first-order axiomatization. The disadvantage is that they are
strictly more general than topological spaces: every topological space is a locale but not every locale is a topological
space. More precisely, it can be shown that the category of topological spaces is a coreflective subcategory of the
category of locales. For this and more motivation on “pointless” topology see the introductory survey by Johnstone
(1983).
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the coherent objects in Sh(CT ), it follows that the pretopos completion of CT can be recovered
from the topological groupoid GT . In other words, T itself can be recovered from GT up to Morita
equivalence.
This result suggests that the syntactic and semantic categories of theories are dual to each other.
On the one hand, we have Pretop, the category of (conceptually complete) syntactic categories. On
the other hand, we have TopGrpd, the category of semantic categories, viz. topological groupoids.
The “semantic functor” Θ : Pretop → TopGrpd is defined by first taking Pretop(P,S), the
category of set-valued models of P , then restricting to the isomorphisms between models, and
finally equipping the resulting groupoid with the “logical” topology. The “syntactic functor” Γ :
TopGrpd→ Pretop is defined by taking a topological groupoid G to the topos B(G) of continuous
G-sets, and then extracting the pretopos of coherent objects in B(G).24
The two functors Θ and Γ are indeed adjoint to each other.
Pretopop TopGrpd
Θ
Γ
However, once again, this adjunction is not an equivalence of categories; i.e.TopGrpd is not exactly
dual to Pretop. Thus, a natural question: can the semantic category Pretopop be characterized
independently of the functor Θ? i.e. can we provide an independent characterization of the category
of (semantically presented) theories? Doing so would lead to a so-called “perfect duality” but such
an independent characterization has so far proved elusive.25
Why do mathematicians value duality results? One reason is that it enables them to transfer
results and concepts from one category to its dual category. Thus, if we had a duality result
24Technically, Awodey and Forssell work with the category dCoh rather than Pretop, and the results must be
adjusted accordingly.
25One reason for this – mysterious as it may sound – is certainly the fact that there seems to be nothing inherently
“category-theoretic” about ultraproducts. As Makkai’s work proves and Los’ theorem has long made obvious, taking
ultraproducts is a fundamental operation when it comes to elementary classes: elementary classes are exactly those
classes closed under elementary equivalence and the taking of ultraproducts. Since every pretopos corresponds to
an elementary class (more precisely: to the category of models of a coherent theory) one would imagine that any
such characterization of Pretop would amount to a characterization of “closure under ultraproducts”. Absent any
useful purely categorical description of ultraproducts (or even ultrafilters) this seems like a significant obstruction.
Nevertheless the work of Leinster (2013) on ultrafilter monads as codensity monads might provide a way out, though
this is still very far from being made precise.
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for syntactic and semantic categories, then we could use information about theories as presented
semantically in order to understanding theories as presented syntactically, and vice versa.
For example, suppose that the theory T ′ results from adding a new predicate symbol (but
no new axioms) to the theory T . There is then an obvious translation of T into T ′, namely the
translation that takes each piece of non-logical vocabulary to itself. This translation corresponds
to a functor F : PT → PT ′ that is faithful, full (since no new functional relations are created), but
not essentially surjective (since no formula from the smaller language maps to the new predicate
symbol). Recalling that F is an arrow in Pretop, there is a dual arrow F ∗ : GT ′ → GT in the
semantic category TopGrp. It is natural to ask then: given that F has such and such features,
what features does its dual arrow F ∗ have? In this case, the failure of essential surjectivity of F
corresponds to the fact that F ∗ is not full, i.e. it forgets structure in the sense of (Weatherall, 2016).
Of course, the question can also be asked the other way around: given a functor K : M → N
between categories of models, how do features of K correspond to features of its dual arrow K∗
in the syntactic category? But here we pause, because in our opinion, the semantic category —
whose objects are categories of models — has not yet been adequately characterized. First, not
every topological groupoid is the groupoid of models of a coherent theory, i.e. Pretopop has fewer
objects than TopGrpd. Second, Pretopop is a 2-category; hence, if Pretopop is to be seen as
living inside TopGrpd, then we must understand the latter as itself a 2-category. But what is the
appropriate 2-categorical structure?26
So, for anyone who wishes to develop the semantic view of theories, the following is a pressing
question:
Given two categories of models M and N, what is a fruitful definition of an arrow
K : M → N? Furthermore, which arrows should be thought of as “reductions” of one
theory to another, which as “equivalences” of theories, and which as other theoretical
relations with which philosophers of science have been concerned?
Recalling what we said earlier: to choose the arrows of a category is to choose a notion of equiva-
lence, and hence to choose a notion of identity of the category’s objects. (Here the objects of the
semantic category are themselves categories, viz. categories of models.) Thus, until one proposes
26Moerdijk (1988, 1990) defines a bicategory LocGrpd of localic groupoids, with bimodules as arrows, and shows
that G 7→ B(G) is an equivalence of categories between LocGrpd and the bicategory of Grothendieck toposes.
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a notion of arrows between semantic categories, then one lacks a clear notion of equivalence of
theories, and hence of how a theory can be identified semantically. For philosophers of science, this
issue demands immediate attention.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have assumed that it can be useful, for a philosophical understanding of science, to
represent theories as mathematical objects. But what is a good, fruitful mathematical framework
for understanding theories? We have surveyed a number of concepts and results from category
theory, which we believe provide strong evidence that it should be the locus of attention for formal
philosophers of science.
Firstly, we have shown that category theory provides the resources to get past philosophy of
science’s false dichotomy, viz. the dichotomy between syntactic versus semantic presentations of
theories. On the one hand, a semantic presentation of a theory is nonetheless a presentation –
written in a mathematical language. On the other hand, the syntactic category of a theory is a
hybrid object, neither purely syntactic, nor purely semantic. Enough of the original syntax of theory
can be reconstructed from its associated syntactic category. Moreover, having equivalent syntactic
categories guarantees having equivalent categories of models. As such, the syntactic category of
a theory unites the semantic and the syntactic approach to (first-order) theories, via the notion
of Morita equivalence: as long as we care about theories up to (a suitable notion of) definitional
equivalence and as long as we care about the classes of models of a theory up to its categorical
structure, then the tension between syntactic and semantic presentations disappears. With this
formal groundwork in place our most urgent task now is to carry as much of this lesson as possible
over to the philosophy of science.
Secondly – with this false dichotomy set aside – philosophers of science are now set free from
the illusion of a direct access to the thing in itself (via the class of models of a theory), and to study
how different representations of the world can be related one to another. The category Th is the
first formal approximation to how this kind of project might be carried out. The kind of notions
about theoretical relations that will emerge will no doubt be interesting and we hope the philosophy
of science lends a keen ear. Aside from this however, the very notion of studying scientific theories
in their totality (i.e. as a structured whole) should lead to a philosophy of science more directly
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attuned to the way theoretical physics is carried out today – where the interaction and interplay
of (sometimes incompatible) theories is not seen merely as a temporary state of confusion as we
approach some ultimate truth, but rather the necessary interactions that have to take place within
any ecosystem before more advanced life can evolve out of it.
Acknowledgments: Thanks to Thomas Barrett for conversation and feedback.
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